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Abstract 
We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience 
goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and 
high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality 
in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price 
above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or 
less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such 
that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we 
also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction 
volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies. 
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1. Introduction 
Buyers of an experience good are uncertain about its quality before they buy, but learn 
(or experience) the good’s quality after having bought and consumed it. Experience goods 
cover the broad middle ground between the extremes of goods involving no quality 
uncertainty at all (so-called inspection or search goods) and goods for which quality is not 
fully revealed even after the consumption (credence goods). Whenever contracts for the 
exchange of a good are incomplete and sellers have leeway to shade its quality about which 
the consumer finds out only if it is too late, the good in question is an experience good. 
Hence, many are. 
A key role in markets for such goods is assumed by trust. Buyers may buy an experience 
good if they trust sellers to provide high quality, and will abstain if they do not. In other 
words, trust induces the demand for experience goods. In contrast, lack of trust impedes 
mutually advantageous transactions and results in low market efficiency.  
We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for 
experience goods. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first study to investigate the role 
of prices and competition for trust and market outcomes. We study two types of markets, 
monopolies and four-firm oligopolies. In both cases, buyers can observe previous histories of 
sellers (their reputations) and the chosen or exogenously set price before they make their 
decisions. 
With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive 
(oligopolistic) markets and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive 
(monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price roughly halfway 
between the observed oligopoly and monopoly prices. The effect in monopolies is pretty 
much as standard intuition would predict. As price falls, volume increases and so does the 
quality of traded goods. Both effects imply a rise in efficiency of around 50%. Surprisingly, 
the same effects occur when we introduce the regulated intermediate price in oligopolies. In 
contrast to standard intuition, demand does not fall in reaction to the price increase and 
quality rises even further, rendering the regulated oligopoly the most efficient market by far. 
This counterintuitive effect of price regulation can be explained as follows. Under 
unregulated Bertrand competition prices fall to a level where buyers do no longer mind that 
much to buy a “lemon”. Consequently, buyers in unregulated oligopolies are rather careless. 
 2
If, on the other hand, higher prices are exogenously imposed, buyers are forced to pay more 
attention to reputations as buying from a low-quality firm does hurt them now substantially. 
In addition, with regulated prices firms lose one of their two “marketing instruments”. The 
only dimension they can now compete is quality. Thus, there are, both, demand- and supply-
induced forces that push up quality. In unregulated oligopolies almost 20% of all traded goods 
are lemons (despite an accurate eBay-style feedback mechanism that allows all buyers to 
track the entire history of all sellers). With price regulation the lemon share falls to just 6%. 
This increase in quality also more than offsets the increase in price such that also the trade 
volume is higher despite the higher price. 
Thus, we do indeed find that price regulation fosters trust in markets for experience 
goods but in rather subtle ways. The causal chain in monopolies has only two simple steps. 
There, a lower regulated price increases demand as textbooks would have it. Given this 
increase in demand it now becomes more costly for monopolists to lose the trust buyers place 
in them and, consequently, they supply higher average quality. The channel through which 
regulation fosters trust in oligopoly is more complex. Here, the direct effect of regulation is 
that buyers become more selective. This increased sensitivity to reputations increases 
trustworthiness which, finally, increases trust.1 
Our finding shows how standard textbook intuition about price and demand can go wrong 
in markets that suffer from informational deficiencies. In the markets we implement, these 
deficiencies cause moral hazard but a similar mechanism may operate in case of adverse 
selection. Regulation may directly aim at removing such deficiencies (for example by 
introducing standardization, certification, or watch dogs) but in many cases such direct 
regulation may be very costly. Price regulation is much cheaper to implement, administer and 
enforce than most other alternatives. Yet, as we see here, it can be very effective. 
Our study is the first experimental investigation into the relation of trust, competition, 
and the role of prices. While there is a sizeable literature on trust games investigating how 
different institutional features (such as feedback or enforcement mechanisms2) impact on 
levels of trust, our previous paper (HUCK, RUCHALA, and TYRAN (2006)) is the first to 
                                                 
1 This complex relation between price, quality and trust is at the core of an interesting book in the management 
literature (SAKO (1992)) comparing inter-firm relations in Britain (low price, low trust, low quality) and Japan 
(high price, high trust, high quality). 
2 See, e.g., KESER (2002), BOLTON, KATOK, and OCKENFELS (2004), BOHNET and HUCK (2004), BOHNET, 
HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005) and FEHR and ZEHNDER (2004). 
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examine the impact of choice of trading partners on trust. The present paper can be seen as 
introducing the second element of competition into the trust game framework, that of price 
choice. 
There is a small experimental literature on price controls in other types of markets. ISAAC 
and PLOTT (1981) study double oral auctions and find that the standard partial equilibrium 
model predicts the effects of price controls remarkably well if the price control (ceiling or 
floor) is binding. For non-binding controls (which according to the model should be neutral) 
they do, however, find some unpredicted effects: price ceilings slightly above the competitive 
equilibrium price lower the actual market price, price floors slightly below the competitive 
equilibrium price increase the actual market price. Similar findings are reported by SMITH and 
WILLIAMS (1981) who also study the dynamic response to the removal of price controls, and 
for posted-offer markets by COURSEY and SMITH (1983). More recently, DUFWENBERG, 
GNEEZY, GOEREE, and NAGEL (in press) report how the introduction of a binding price floor 
in a Bertrand duopoly, somewhat perversely, decreases actual prices. All of these studies 
examine, however, markets for inspection goods of known quality such that there are no 
informational asymmetries that would hinder market performance. 
2. Experimental design, procedures and a little bit of theory 
Figure 1 shows the basic game used in all treatments of the experiment, a binary trust 
game with a price p. This game is a stylized representation of a situation in which a buyer has 
to decide whether or not to buy an experience good of the quality which is chosen by the 
seller after the buyer’s choice. In case the buyer decides not to buy the good (move “X” in 
Figure 1) we assume that he buys a simple item of known quality (an inspection good) that all 
sellers carry in their shops, just so that he does not leave empty-handed. This results in 
payoffs of 20 for the buyer and 15 for the seller. This simply captures the idea that for a seller 
it is always good to attract a buyer to his shop even if the buyer does not choose the more 
expensive experience good. As we will see this is particularly important in the competition 
case where a seller’s worst nightmare is an empty store which gives a zero payoff. While the 
inspection good provides a low but certain payoff, the payoff from the experience good can be 
high but is uncertain because it depends on the seller’s choice of quality. While we effectively 
assume that the price of the inspection good is fixed (say, due to perfect competition in that 
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market) the price, p, of the experience good is, in principle, flexible but will be regulated in 
some treatments.  
In Figure 1, if the buyer decides to trust the seller (move “Y”), the seller can choose 
between low quality (move “left”) and high quality (move “right”). Delivering low quality is 
more profitable for the seller (due to lower costs) but harms the buyer. The buyer in fact 
prefers not to buy the experience good at all over buying a low-quality good as long as the 
price is not below 40 (which we rule out in our experiment). 
Figure 1: A trust game with a variable price p 
                       
In all our experiments there are four sellers and four buyers who interact over 30 periods. 
To implement monopolistic markets we randomly assign buyers to sellers. Each buyer is 
assigned with probability ¼ to each seller which implies that sellers can have multiple (or no) 
buyers in any given period. In oligopolistic markets buyers choose sellers, knowing each 
seller’s price. In markets with endogenous prices, prices are chosen by sellers at the very 
beginning of each period. In treatments with a regulated price this price-setting stage is 
simply omitted. 
Table 1: Treatments in the 2x2 design 
  partner choice 
  no yes 
no (p = 55) MON-REG OLI-REG price choice 
yes (40 ≤ p ≤ 85) MON-FREE OLI-FREE 
We implement a 2x2 design. Table 1 gives an overview of the treatments. In MON-FREE 
there is random matching and (monopolistic) sellers freely choose a price from a range 
between 40 and 85. In OLI-FREE matching is endogenous, i.e., buyers choose sellers once 
A
B
 X Y
left . right;;
A:  60 – p points 
B:  p – 5 points
A: 20 points
B: 15 points
A:  85 – p points 
B:  p – 30 points 
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sellers have chosen their prices, again with 40 ≤ p ≤ 85. In MON-REG matching is random 
again but now the price is exogenously fixed to p = 55. Finally, in OLI-REG matching is 
endogenous but the price is again fixed to p = 55. 
We recruited 288 participants, mostly students from various fields, via the internet.3 
Upon arrival subjects were provided with written instructions and randomly assigned to 
cubicles in the laboratory.4 Each subject only participated in one session and we made sure 
that no subject had participated in other related trust studies. The instructions employed 
neutral language, avoiding terms like “trust”, “trustworthiness”, “buyer”, “seller” and “price”. 
Buyer and sellers were simply called “A”-participants and “B”-participants, respectively. 
Decisions were labeled as in Figure 1. In treatments with endogenous price choice “B”-
participants decided upon a “number p” at the beginning of each round. Several control 
questions were included at the end of the instructions to ensure that the participants 
understood the game. The experiment started after all participants had answered all the 
control questions correctly and there were no further questions regarding the game. Subjects 
were randomly and anonymously matched to groups of eight and were randomly assigned one 
of two roles: four participants took the role of buyers and four participants the role of sellers. 
Additionally, to identify participants over rounds, buyers and sellers were randomly assigned 
a number between one and four. The role and the number were communicated to subjects via 
the first computer screen. Matching groups of eight, roles, as well as assigned numbers stayed 
constant throughout the entire experiment.  
For each treatment we have nine independent matching groups with eight subjects each. 
Sessions lasted on average between 60 and 90 minutes including instruction time. Participants 
received a lump sum depending on their role in the experiment.5 During the experiment 
payoffs were given in points which in the end were changed into Euro by a previously known 
exchange rate of 1 point per 0.015 Euro. All subjects were paid anonymously. 
As mentioned before, in the FREE treatments sellers chose a price p at the beginning of 
each period. Prices were displayed to all buyers and sellers.6 Following this, depending on the 
                                                 
3 We used GREINER’s (2004) ORSEE. 
4 A translation of the instructions is given in Appendix A. The original text was written in German and is 
available from the authors on request. The experimental software was programmed in FISCHBACHER’s (1999)  
z-Tree and the experiment was run in the experimental laboratory at the University of Erfurt. 
5 While buyers received 150 points, sellers received 330 points. A higher lump sum fee for sellers was paid in 
order to provide a suitable payoff for sellers who did not very often interact with buyers. 
6 We kindly asked subjects to note the respective number p on a provided blank for all buyers in all rounds. 
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matching procedure, buyers were either randomly assigned to a seller or chose one. After that 
they chose between “X” or “Y”. Then sellers learned how many buyers were matched with 
them as well as how many of those also decided to buy the experience good. Note that the 
outside option of 15 is paid to a seller if he is first matched with a buyer who then decides not 
to buy the experience good, while the seller’s payoff is zero if no buyer is matched with him.7 
Then finally, given a seller had at least one buyer of the experience good, the seller had to 
decide between “left” and “right” – and this decision determined the quality sold to all his 
buyers, i.e., sellers could not discriminate between different buyers (who they could not 
identify anyway).  
At the end of each period, buyers who decided to buy the experience good were reminded 
of the respective price p and informed about the choice their seller had made as well as about 
the resulting payoff. Sellers were simply reminded of their price p and of the number of 
buyers who bought the experience good from them, their own choice and the resulting 
payoff.8 The sequence of the game with price competition is displayed in Figure 2; without 
price competition, of course, the first stage is missing, i.e. sellers did not get to choose the 
price p at the beginning of the game. 
Figure 2: Sequence of the game with price competition 
 
In all treatments the same feedback information is provided: all subjects (buyers and 
sellers) have access to the entire history of the population game, i.e. there is a “history 
window” which visualizes past decisions of sellers with respect to quality levels. This simple 
graphical tool contains four columns of different colored hash (#) signs, each column 
representing one seller and each row representing one period. Originally, each column 
consists of thirty white hash signs, white representing the not-yet-reached future. Then, 
following a given color code hash signs changed their color according to what happened in 
                                                 
7 Remember that even if a buyer might not trust the seller with the experience good, the seller has also an 
inspection good to sell which the buyer buys. 
sellers choose 
price p 
buyers choose 
seller / are 
assigned to 
seller 
buyers choose 
not to buy 
“X” or to buy 
“Y” the 
experience 
good
sellers choose low 
quality “left” or 
high quality 
“right” for all 
buyers of the 
experience good
sellers and 
buyers are 
informed 
about actions 
and payoffs 
history of all sellers is reproduced in the “history window” 
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the game: a hash turned black if a seller did not have a buyer; a hash turned red if a seller had 
at least one buyer and chose low quality; finally, a hash turned green if a seller had at least 
one buyer and chose high quality.9 Additionally, in case of the colors red or green, hash signs 
were followed by a number showing how many buyers had bought the experience good from 
this seller. A sample screen shot for buyers and sellers respectively is shown in Appendix B. 
For the one-shot game theoretical predictions do not depend on whether or not there is 
competition. With a fixed price all sellers will choose “left” if the subgame is actually 
reached. This will be anticipated by buyers who will choose the outside option “X”. With a 
flexible price a monopolist would, of course, try to extract as much rent as possible but he 
cannot raise the price above 40 without losing the custom of the buyer. The subgame perfect 
equilibrium prediction is, hence, that the seller will choose p = 40, the buyer will choose “Y,” 
and the seller will, finally, pick low quality by playing “left.” With Bertrand competition the 
price would be driven down to p = 5 but in order to ensure better comparability between the 
treatments we cut the possible price range at the monopoly level. This makes also sure that 
the nature of the subgame, after the price is determined, is identical in all games: With a price 
(weakly) above 40 the subgame remains a trust game where the buyer has to think about 
whether or not he really wants to purchase the good. With prices below 40 the nature of the 
subgame would crucially change since buyers would then prefer to buy the good regardless of 
its quality. The bottom line is that the theoretical predictions for the one-shot game are 
identical for both, monopoly and oligopoly. And this is true under both price setting 
mechanisms. The one-shot theory predicts that it only matters whether the price is exogenous 
or endogenous – whether there is competition via endogenous matching or not is irrelevant. 
In finitely repeated games, the predictions remain the same. In case of exogenous prices 
all Nash equilibria predict no trade; in case of price competition all subgame perfect equilibria 
predict low-quality trade at a price of p = 40. 
Of course, these predictions are extremely naïve in that they assume that all subjects are 
fully rational selfish money maximizers and have common knowledge of this fact. As such 
they just provide a simple benchmark helping to organize some basic facts. More realistic 
models would allow for incomplete information and reputation building or for the presence of 
some behavioral types. In such environments competition would, of course, make a difference 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Note that sellers who interacted with more than one buyer received a payoff from each interaction. 
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as sellers would compete for custom not only via price but also via their reputations (in the 
REG treatments only via their reputations). From this perspective, one would expect 
competition to matter in the usual way: Since endogenous matching creates incentives for 
having a good reputation sellers should provide more high quality. This effect should be 
unambiguous in treatments with fixed prices. Modeling the FREE treatments would be 
trickier. In essence, sellers with identical reputations would again drive down the price to the 
bottom. But sellers with better reputations might now not only attract more buyers but could 
also be able to charge higher prices. In symmetric equilibria this would only be relevant off 
the equilibrium path but would basically induce even stronger incentives for the provision of 
high quality. 
3. Experimental Results 
Aggregate data 
Table 2 summarizes the data from our experiment. The upper part of the table reports 
average posted prices, trust rates (the average share of trade), quality (the average share of 
high-quality among traded goods) and efficiency (the average share of buyer-seller pairings 
that resulted in high quality trade).10 The lower part of the table reports tests for significance 
of price regulation and competition. These MWU tests use market-level averages over 30 
periods (i.e. 9 observations per treatment) as a unit of observation.  
Notice first the highly significant and substantial effect of endogenous matching. Both 
oligopoly treatments vastly outperform the monopolies, roughly tripling efficiency rates. This 
boost is driven by, both, higher average quantity and quality. In addition, average prices are 
much lower with competition (47.06) than without (59.60). 
Similarly clear effects are observed with respect to regulation. In both market forms price 
regulation improves market performance. In MON, price regulation boosts trust from 36% to 
51%, quality from 60% to 73% and efficiency from 22% to 37%. In OLI, a similar picture 
arises. Trust increases from 85% to 90%, quality from 80% to 94%, and efficiency from 68% 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Of course, our color coding is arbitrary. It serves the purpose of making the complex history window easily to 
read. Of course, their might have been problems with color-blind subjects but fortunately there were none. 
10 Note that, as long as the buyer trusts, the sum of payoffs is maximal. Only the distribution of payoffs depends 
on the sellers’ quality choice. But, crucially, the outcome after (Y, left) is not individually rational as the buyer 
would prefer X. Hence, we shall in what follows refer to (Y, right), the outcome with successful trade, as “the 
efficient outcome” (short for “the individually rational efficient outcome”). 
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to 85%. As can be seen in the bottom part of the table, all these effects are statistically 
significant with the exception of the demand effect in the oligopoly treatments. 
Table 2: Overview of aggregated results 
 Price Trust / Quantity Quality11 Efficiency 
MON-FREE 
59.60 
(2.50) 
0.36 
(0.19) 
0.60 
(0.27) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
MON-REG 
55.00 
[n.a.] 
0.51 
(0.16) 
0.73 
(0.16) 
0.37 
(0.19) 
OLI-FREE 
47.06 
(5.99) 
0.85 
(0.16) 
0.80 
(0.23) 
0.68 
(0.26) 
OLI-REG 55.00 [n.a.] 
0.90 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.03) 
0.85 
(0.07) 
 effect of price regulation 
MON-FREE – MON-REG n.a. p = 0.039 p = 0.081 p = 0.047 
OLI-FREE – OLI-REG n.a. p = 0.423 p = 0.031 p = 0.083 
 effect of competition 
OLI-REG – MON-REG n.a. p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
OLI-FREE – MON-FREE p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.016 p = 0.001 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Treatment effects are tested by one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests. 
These unambiguous results are surprising. In one case, we observe that a lower price 
improves market performance, in the other that a higher price also improves performance. 
Taken together this suggests a non-monotonic relation between prices and efficiency in 
markets for experience goods. With very low prices markets suffer because neither are 
consumers particularly careful when selecting a good, nor are there good incentives for firms 
to provide high quality: both, because consumers are less discerning and because the profit 
margin of high-quality goods becomes too small. On the other hand, with very high prices 
demand drops to such low levels that the incentives for reputation building are severely 
reduced. Thus, market efficiency is maximal with a regulated intermediate price that is high 
enough to ensure that high-quality products are profitable but at the same time not too high in 
order to keep demand at levels where the incentives for high quality provision and reputation 
building are maintained.  
                                                 
11 The reported quality corrects for the number of interactions a seller had in a period. Thus, if a seller had 
4≤n  buyers his quality choice enters the average n-times. If one considers each seller’s decision only once 
following average qualities are obtained: MON-FREE 0.58, MON-REG 0.73, OLI-FREE 0.78, and OLI-REG 
0.94. 
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How do all these effects translate into payoffs for buyers and sellers? Figure 3 shows 
buyers’ and sellers’ earnings averaged over all periods in the four treatments. In line with 
standard intuition, forcing up prices by regulation in a competitive market harms buyers (their 
average incomes fall by 21%, from 1058 to 831), but benefits sellers (their average incomes 
increase by 50%, from 504 to 758). In contrast, forcing prices down by regulation benefits 
both buyers and sellers in non-competitive markets (MON). Buyer incomes increase by 6%, 
and, surprisingly, seller incomes also increase by 9%.12 Figure 7 also shows that, quite 
remarkably, the regulated oligopoly is the most profitable market institution for sellers, while 
it is, of course less surprising that Bertrand competition is best for buyers.  
Figure 3: Average earnings over all periods 
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Market measures over time 
Figures 4a and 5 to 7 show how the measures of Table 2 behave over time. Additionally, 
Figure 4b shows the distribution of posted prices in treatments with FREE price choice. 
Figure 4a shows posted prices averaged over all 9 markets in the two treatments with 
FREE price choice along with the regulated price of 55 as a benchmark. Competition unfolds 
its effect in OLI-FREE only over time. Over the first 12 periods, posted prices continuously 
                                                 
12 The increase for buyers and sellers is, however, not significant in a monopolistic market (Mann-Whitney U-
tests: for buyers 0.340 and for sellers 0.113, two-tailed). The change in buyer and seller payoffs in an 
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fall from 57.67 to around 45, and then remain close to this value for the rest of the periods. 
While prices start out at the same level in MON-FREE as in OLI-FREE, they remain at high 
levels. The average price in MON-FREE is 59.60 and in OLI-FREE it is 47.06 over all 
periods. Therefore, the regulated price is about 8% below the average posted price in MON-
FREE, and about 22% above the convergence price of 45 in OLI-FREE. 
Figure 4a: Average posted price in treatments with FREE prices 
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oligopolistic market, on the other hand, is (Mann-Whitney U-tests: for buyers 0.001 and sellers 0.002, two-
tailed). 
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Figure 4b: Cumulative distribution of posted prices in treatments with FREE prices 
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On average, buyers were more likely to buy from sellers who posted low prices in both 
treatments with FREE prices. In fact, the average transaction price was 54.18 in MON-FREE 
and 42.85 in OLI-FREE over all periods. In the second half of the game, the average 
transaction price in OLI-FREE falls to 40.76 with a small standard deviation of 1.35. This 
illustrates how intense price competition was in OLI-FREE. 
Evidence of the intensity of price competition in OLI-FREE also comes from a 
comparison of the cumulative distribution of posted prices with MON-FREE (see Figure 4b). 
For example, 66.57% of all posted prices are below 45 in OLI-FREE, but only 13.61% are in 
MON-FREE. Prices in MON-FREE are highly concentrated between 54 and 60 (more than 
40% of all prices), while only few sellers (about 7%) choose prices in this range in OLI-
FREE. 
 13
Figure 5: Average trust rates (average quantity) over time 
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Figure 5 shows that trust rates (i.e. the average share of experience goods traded) start out 
at similar levels of around 50% in all treatments. While, as with prices, there are no initial 
differences between the treatments already after 5 periods, demand is clearly higher in the 
treatments where sellers compete for the business of buyers (i.e. in OLI) than in those without 
competition, and the difference becomes more pronounced over time. In the two treatments 
with oligopolistic competition, trust rates approach 100% in the last third of the experiment 
while they hover around 30-40% in treatments without competition. Clearly, competition via 
reputation induces trust in the sellers.  
 14
Figure 6: Average quality over time 
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Figure 6 plots average quality over time. In contrast to what we have seen with regard to 
prices and demand, there are huge initial differences between treatments. Both treatments 
with regulation exhibit far higher initial quality than the unregulated treatments (despite 
similar initial prices). How can this difference be explained? We conjecture that having just 
one “marketing instrument”, namely quality, makes firms much more aware of its importance. 
Perhaps sellers in the unregulated treatments believe that they can always compensate for a 
damaged reputation by lowering prices later on (which is, of course, true as in particular the 
unregulated oligopoly treatment shows where prices fall to very low levels). Average quality 
increases in all markets over time and is higher in the second half of the experiment (up to 
period 28) than in the first half.13 Apparently, it takes some time for sellers to understand the 
value of a good reputation.14 Yet, treatment effects on the levels of quality are substantial 
even if we average over all 30 periods (see Table 2). The most stable treatment is OLI-REG. 
Remarkably the nine regulated oligopolies have average qualities of exactly 100% over 
almost all periods in the second half of the experiment.  
End-game effects are pronounced in all treatments which is in line with previous findings 
in finitely repeated games. The significance of these end-game effects is twofold. First, we 
                                                 
13 In OLI-REG the average quality for periods 1-15 is 0.75 and rises to 1.00 for periods 16-28. The respective 
values for the other treatments are: MON-FREE 0.49 / 0.77; MON-REG 0.72 / 0.78 and OLI-FREE 0.75 / 0.89. 
14 BOHNET, HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005) show that many traders who initially do not understand the 
mechanics of reputation building benefit from observing others who do. 
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see that markets do not make people more trustworthy or more trusting in general. 
Competition simply induces incentives for strategic behavior.15 Second, the end-game effect 
illustrates that participants do have a proper understanding of the strategic nature of the stage 
game. Sellers simply stop providing high quality when it ceases to have a beneficial effect on 
their reputation. Remarkably, this only happens in the very last (and to some extent in the 
next-to-last) period. 
Figure 7: Average efficiency over time 
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Finally, Figure 7 shows the compound effects of demand and quality on market 
efficiency over time. There is a clear and consistent ranking of average market efficiency in 
the four treatments. Competitive markets outperform monopolies and price regulation 
improves efficiency in both types of markets for experience goods. 
Understanding the benefits of price regulation 
The most striking finding in our experiment is the beneficial effect of price regulation in 
oligopolistic markets. The flip side of this is the detrimental effects of price competition in 
these markets. Price competition is fierce in OLI-FREE and quality is significantly lower in 
OLI-FREE than in OLI-REG. And we have discussed the consequences of this price 
                                                 
15 BOHNET, FREY, and HUCK (2001) report data from a finite-horizon trust experiment where trustworthiness 
reaches its maximum in the very last period. A conjecture is that this is driven by the public aggregate feedback 
they provide. 
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differential before. With very low prices consumers are less sensitive to reputations and for 
firms the profit margin of high-quality goods becomes dangerously low. But why is price 
competition so fierce in OLI-FREE? In other words, why is there not more competition via 
quality? The reason is that sellers had no other choice than cutting their prices to the bottom. 
When sellers compete both via prices and via reputations, buyers seem to pay more attention 
to prices (which are not noisy) than to reputations (which are noisy in the sense that a seller 
who provided good quality in the past might still provide low quality in his next transaction). 
Buyers are apparently reluctant to trade-off higher prices against higher reputations. 
From whom did buyers buy? The answer is simple: from the firm with the lowest price. 
This holds in 85.34% of all purchases in OLI-FREE, while only 57.55% of all goods were 
bought from the seller with the best reputation.16 (As the numbers indicate, it happened quite 
often that the seller with the lowest price also had the best reputation, namely in 65.46% of all 
cases in which buyers bought the cheapest good.) 
Buyers’ obsession with low prices forces sellers to engage in cut-throat Bertrand 
competition. While sellers could reap some price premium of higher quality in MON, this was 
not the case in OLI. For example, in MON, sellers who provided high quality charged prices 
of 55.35 on average, while sellers who sold low quality could only charge a price of 52.55. In 
contrast, the high-quality sellers in OLI charged lower prices (42.42) than the low-quality 
sellers (44.35). 
Fierce price competition in OLI-FREE is not only explained by the sale of relatively 
unprofitable experience goods (recall from Figure 1 that at the convergence price of 45, 
selling a high-quality experience goods only yields a profit of 15). Posting low prices was 
attractive for sellers in OLI-FREE because it also helped to attract non-trusting buyers who 
instead of choosing a good of unknown quality preferred to buy the low-value inspection 
good. The profit from these buyers is also 15 (see Figure 1). Hence, at prices of 45 which are 
typical in much of OLI-FREE, a seller is indifferent between selling a high-quality experience 
good or an inspection good. In fact, we find that even buyers who decide not to buy the 
experience good typically buy the inspection good from the seller who posts the lowest price. 
It appears, thus, that buyers like the idea of fierce price competition as such. Perhaps they 
want to reward low-price sellers hoping that one day these sellers will also offer high quality. 
                                                 
16 For our purpose, we define the seller who most frequently choose high quality for the experience good as the 
seller with the best reputation. Of course, one can think of several ways to match this characteristic. 
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Alas, this hope is in vain. Of course, all this happens in an environment where average quality 
is with 80% pretty high. Yet, for the 20% disappointments buyers have to endure, they have 
nobody to blame but their own obsession with price.  
4. Conclusion 
Competition has generally two elements: choice of trading partners and choice of price. 
In this paper we show that while the former is unambiguously good, the latter can be 
problematic in markets that suffer from informational deficiencies. In particular, we show that 
in markets with experience goods (suffering from moral hazard) regulated fixed prices can 
outperform endogenous prices in both, monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. This is 
surprising but has, as we argued above, an intuitive reason. If both, trading partners and 
prices, are endogenously chosen, price competition becomes so fierce that sellers’ incentives 
to build up pristine reputations are diminished, simply because profits from high-quality 
goods become too small. In other words, if consumers do not reward high quality with a 
willingness to pay higher prices, they should not be surprised if quality is less than perfect.  
Anecdotally, our finding seems to resemble a string of recent scandals in the German 
meat market that was plagued by huge amounts of extremely low-quality meat (well past its 
sell-by date, in fact, in some cases biologically hazardous). An interesting discussion ensued 
with two main lines of arguments: calls for more regulation were as abundant as fierce 
criticism of German consumers’ obsession with everything that is cheap. (In particular, when 
it comes to non-durables Germans tend to have a low willingness to pay. For food, for 
example, they spend, in relative terms, only around three quarters of what Italian consumers 
spend, see SEALE, REGMI, and BERNSTEIN (2003).) In the context of our stylized study both 
arguments appear to be valid. Clearly, we find that it is consumers’ choice behavior that 
diminishes sellers’ incentives to provide high quality. Yet, regulation can also overcome the 
problem.  
But the intriguing aspect of our findings is that regulation needs not target quality. Of 
course, quality regulation constitutes one way to improve market outcomes but it is 
notoriously complicated and costly. Again, this is anecdotally reflected in the example of the 
German meat market where quality controls differ hugely between different states and there is 
no sign of reaching a consensus on how monitoring should be improved. Our study suggests 
that there might be an inexpensive yet very efficient short-cut: price regulation. With higher 
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enforced prices consumers become more careful in choosing sellers. They pay more attention 
to reputations and, consequently, sellers face much steeper incentives to provide high quality. 
Closer to orthodox beliefs are our findings on the first aspect of competition, endogenous 
choice of trading partners. In our earlier paper (HUCK, RUCHALA, and TYRAN (2006)) we have 
shown that such choice on its own can improve market outcomes enormously. In that study 
we show that these improvements occur under different feedback institutions. In particular, 
the study shows that for choice to work it is not necessary that consumers have access to full 
feedback, i.e., to the entire history of all sellers. Rather, it is sufficient that buyers simply 
remember their own experience with sellers. That is, as long as sellers are not perfectly 
anonymous and are identified via labels, endogenous choice of trading partners is shown to 
have substantial positive effects. From the perspective of this earlier paper, the current one 
establishes that the same beneficial effects of choice hold in the presence of the second 
element of competition: endogenously chosen prices. 
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Appendix A: Instructions (Treatment OLI-FREE) 
(Original instructions were in German. They are available from the authors upon request.  
In treatments without choice of sellers A-participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four B-participants. In the ones without price choice, i.e. with a regulated price, B-
participants didn’t have to choose a number p. There, the figure in the instructions already 
displayed the unambiguous resulting payoffs.) 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Please read these instructions carefully! Do not speak to your neighbors and keep quiet 
during the entire experiment! In case you have a question raise your hand! We will then come 
to you. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly separated into subpopulations of 8 
participants. During the experiment you solely interact with the participants of your 
subpopulation. 
 
In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. Doing this you can earn points. Your 
total sum of points plus a show-up fee, which is dependent on your role in the experiment, 
will be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment and paid to you in cash. The show-
up fee amounts to 150 points for A-participants and 330 points for B-participants. Following 
rule applies to the conversion of points into Euros: 
1 point = 0.015 € 
How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants in 
your subpopulation. All participants receive the same instructions. All decisions are made 
anonymously. No other participant will get to know your name and your payoff.  
 
Altogether there are (in your subpopulation) eight participants. At the beginning of the 
experiment all participants are randomly assigned one of two roles (A or B) which is 
displayed on the computer screen. There are four A-participants (A1, A2, A3 and A4) and four 
B-participants (B1, B2, B3 and B4). All participants keep their role and the number assigned 
to them throughout the experiment.  
 
At the beginning of each round each B-participant chooses a number p from 40 to 85 which 
is after that revealed to all A- and B-participants. This number p has an impact, as will be 
explained later on, on the payoffs for A- and B-participants (see also figure). Thereafter each 
A-participant chooses one of the four B-participants with whom he interacts in this period, 
this means that A-participants decide whether they want to interact with B1, B2, B3 or B4. 
Therefore, a B-participant can interact with zero to four A-participants in one round. This 
process is repeated in the next round.  
 
B-participants only learn the number of A-participants who chose them, but not who has 
chosen them.  
 
After the A-participants have chosen the B-participants, it is each A-participants turn to make 
a decision. More specifically, each A-participant has to choose between option X and Y (see 
figure). If he picks option X, the A-participant will earn 20 points and the B-participant 
chosen by him will earn 15 points from this interaction. If he picks option Y, the payoffs 
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depend on the choice of the B-participant chosen by him who has to decide whether he wants 
to go “left” of “right”. If he decides to pick “left”, the A-participant will earn 60 – p points 
and the B-participant will earn p – 5 points from this interaction. If he decides to pick “right”, 
the A-participant will earn 85 – p points and the B-participant will earn p – 30 points. 
 
If a B-participant is not chosen by at least one A-participant or if all A-participants who have 
chosen him picked X, he does not have to make a decision. Otherwise the B-participant 
additionally learns the number of A-participants who have chosen him and picked Y and has 
to make the same decision for all these A-participants, that is whether he wants to go “left” or 
“right” for all A-participants. A B-participant who has not been chosen by at least one A-
participant earns 0 points. 
 
Payoffs for an A-participant and a B-participant from one interaction. 
                            
(B-participants can receive payoffs from several interactions in one round.) 
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. After each round you will be informed about what has 
happened and you will be reminded of your payoff and your total sum of points so far. 
 
Moreover, all (A- and B-) participants can keep track of the entire history of B-
participants. For all participants there will be a screen depicting the history of all B-
participants. For each round and each B-participant there will be a colored little # (hash) with 
a number behind. 
• A black # indicates that the B-participant had nothing to decide because either no  
A-participant chose him or all A-participants who chose him picked X. 
• A red # indicates that the B-participant picked “left”. 
• A green # indicates that the B-participant picked “right”. 
• The integer behind the # shows the number of A-participants who picked Y after 
choosing this B-participant. 
Please note on the additionally distributed blank the respective number p of each B-
participant which is displayed to you above the relevant column on the screen. 
These are the rules. Your can trust us that everything will happen exactly according to these 
rules. Take your time going over these instructions again and feel free to ask questions. But 
don’t shout! Simply raise your hand. 
A
B
 X Y
left right
A:  60 – p points 
B:  p – 5 points
A: 20 points
B: 15 points
A:  85 – p points 
B:  p – 30 points 
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Appendix B: Screenshot (Example: OLI-FREE) 
A-participant’s screen 
 
B-participant’s screen 
 
